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Resurgence of covid-19 in Japan
The government looks set to repeat its mistakes
Kazuki Shimizu, 1 , 2 George Wharton, 1 Haruka Sakamoto, 3 Elias Mossialos1
Japan has seen a resurgence of covid-19, and the
effective reproduction number has been above 1 for
two months. The daily confirmed cases reached
nearly 2000 in early August.1
Since the start of the pandemic the country has
focused on controlling clusters of more than five
covid-19 cases and preventing environmental
transmission in the “3Cs”: closed spaces, crowded
places, and close contact settings.2 Initially, early
detection of clusters and investigation of linkages
between clusters helped reduce the spread of
infection. But it couldn’t prevent the surge in
incidence that began around mid-March. The
declaration of a state of emergency in April helped
control the pandemic’s trajectory,3 although the
measures lacked legal authority and depended on
citizens’ self-restraint. The state of emergency was
lifted in late May.
Failings in the government’s early handling of the
crisis have exacerbated thepandemic’s overall effect
and resulted in 8.22 covid-19 deaths per million
people: the third highest rate in the Western Pacific
region after Philippines and Australia.1
What went wrong
Clear lessons have emerged from Japan’s response
to the first wave of covid-19. Firstly, Japan made
insufficient effort to expand laboratory testing.2 Lack
of capacity meant many requests for polymerase
chain reaction (PCR) testing from doctors were
rejected by the public health centres that govern
community response to covid-19. This led to an
increase in the number of undiagnosed cases, which
in turn increased both community acquired and
hospital acquired infections.4Health systemcapacity
was therefore diverted away from other essential
health services.
Public health centres were overwhelmed by
mid-March, as Japan relied on inefficient paper based
systems for reporting patients’ information. Use of
manual data systems has resulted in inaccuracies
and duplication of records.
Although citizenswere asked to voluntarily avoid the
3Cs,2 behaviour modification campaigns were not
effective in the early phase of the pandemic. As the
Japanese authorities failed to introduce clear
incentives to encourage public adherence, most
people did not change their behaviour promptly.5
Closely linked to this, the government’s
communication strategywas inadequate, evenduring
the state of emergency. Messages to avoid the 3Cs
were clear,2 but the importance of physical
distancing,washinghands frequently, stayinghome,
and protecting health systems were not
communicated persuasively enough to change
behaviours.
Japan’s response was also affected by tension
between the politics and the science of the pandemic.
An expert committee established as a subsidiary of
the cabinetwas insufficiently independent to provide
truly impartial advice. The committee lacked
representatives from essential disciplines such as
economics, behavioural science, andcommunication,
and decision making processes were poorly
explained. For example, the committee’s
recommendation that social contact should decrease
by 80%was later weakened by the government to “a
minimum of 70%, or ideally 80%” without further
clarification.6
Finally, the government lacked accountability and
transparency. For example, the decision to postpone
the Tokyo 2020Olympics andParalympicswasmade
abruptly without explaining how the decision had
been reached.7Moreover, the prime minister
underminedadherence tomeasures introducedunder
Japan’s state of emergency by describing it as
“different from a lockdown as we are seeing take
place overseas.”6 Visits to workplaces and public
transport hubs initially decreased by only 23% and
46%, respectively.8
The Japanese healthcare system was pushed to near
collapse by inadequate human resources and
personal protective equipment (PPE) in late April.2
Healthcare workers were blamed for the chaos, and
many were bullied and harassed as a result.9
Scrutiny, transparency
Detailed scrutiny of the government’s handling of
the pandemic is essential to learn from earlier
mistakes. Instead, however, the government
abolished its expert committee in June,10 reducing
scrutiny and transparency still further. Worse, as
covid-19 surged in late July, Japan launched a
domestic tourism campaign that encouraged people
to travel freely throughout the country while failing
to tackle the many public health problems that
remained.11 The number of PCR tests is currently
limited to fewer than 40 000 a day,12 and the capacity
of both hospitals and isolation facilities may be
insufficient to cope with the resurgence. There has
been scant discussion of how to expand testing, and
digitalisation remains a work in progress.
Centrally coordinated command and control
structures andunambiguous communicationarevital
to persuade the public to change its behaviour.
Expanding testing capacity, implementing
widespread testing for asymptomatic people, and
effective contact tracing, isolation, and quarantine
are also critical, alongwith fully digital epidemiology
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to monitor changes in the reproduction number and to inform an
effective response. Logistics must be strengthened to allow faster
and more responsive procurement of PPE, essential to protect
frontline workers and patients.
Unless the Japanese government shifts from cluster based
countermeasures to a response based on the above principles,
examines and learns from previous mistakes, and deploys cutting
edge science such as genetic sequencing and big data analytics,
Japan’s health services will be overwhelmed again and more lives
will be needlessly lost in the months ahead.
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